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Net-authoritarianism? How web ideologies reinforce political hierarchies in the Italian 5 
Star Movement 
Emiliano Treré, Autonomous University of Querétaro 
Veronica Barassi, Goldsmiths University of London 
 
Abstract 
This article responds to current critiques about the myths of digital democracy drawing on the 
case study of the Italian Movimento 5 Stelle/5 Star Movement (5SM) lead by comedian-
turned-politician Beppe Grillo. We argue that the political success of the 5SM was largely 
dependent on a process of technological fetishism of the Net as an autonomous political agent. 
We also contend that this process has enabled the party leaders to build an ideology of the 
movement and represent the 5SM as a grassroots movement based on horizontal networks, 
participatory democracy, and characterized by the absence of leadership. Conversely, we 
claim that the digital rhetoric of horizontality, lack of leadership and spontaneity of the party is 
used to mask, facilitate and reinforce the authority of Beppe Grillo as political leader, thus 
forging a new type of authoritarianism that is supported and legitimated through the everyday 
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The relationship between political discourses and technological advancements has defined the 
historical development of the Internet. During the mid-1990s – as Internet links and networks 
were being strengthened and shared, and the first ‘online communities’ were being formed – 
different scholars were quick to come to conclusions on the so called revolutionary and 
transformative impacts of the Internet. Negroponte (1995) wrote about a radical cultural 
change and the moving away from the politics of the nation state. Rheingold (1994) discussed 
the emergence of new forms of social life, the virtual communities, which were [to be] self-
governed and horizontal in essence. Toffler and Toffler (1995) believed that the Internet was 
creating a third way, a new civilization, which was based on information highways and which 
clashed with older forms of politics, and political engagement. Castells (1996) instead 
contended that the world was witnessing the rise of a network society, based on autonomous 
information and communication networks that was different from older forms of society. All 
these works saw the Internet as a transformative and even revolutionary force and believed 
that the new technologies had a radical impact on creating new forms of social and cultural 
organization, with positive and democratic consequences for political practice.  
    With the burst of the dot.com bubble at the beginning of the 2000s, venture capitalists lost 
confidence in dot.com businesses and the ‘hype’ over the so called revolutionary qualities of 
the Internet slightly decreased (Mosco 2004: 3–5), and in social and communication research 
we have witnessed the rise of more critical and nuanced understandings on the social impacts 
of Internet technologies (Woolgar 2002). However, as Mosco (2004) argued, technological 
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hypes often function in cycles, and this is certainly true if we consider the history of the 
Internet. By 2005, when the term Web 2.0 became widespread – mostly through the discourses 
promoted by the O’Reilly Media Group (2005) – the ideological discourse on the new 
democratic and revolutionary qualities of the Internet re-established itself with surprising 
force. Benkler (2006) argued that the world was witnessing a moment of opportunity and 
change as well as the rise of a new, networked economy, based on co-production and 
participation. Tapscott and Williams (2006) revived the concept of prosumer coined by Toffler 
(1980) over twenty years before. They argued that the new web technologies enabled the 
making of a new type of social organization, which was based on the disintegration of old 
hierarchies and power relations. A few years later, Shirky (2008) claimed that new web 
platforms were radically transforming the ways social groups organized themselves and were 
re-defining the ways in which people and collectives worked. In the following years, with the 
explosion of protest movements across the world, technological understandings have been 
entrenched with techno-optimistic analyses of how the new web was allegedly transforming 
social organization and political life (Castells 2009).  
Within current communication and social research, one feels the urgency to deconstruct 
these techno-optimistic understandings about the democratic potentials of Internet 
technologies and to reflect critically on the myths of digital democracy (Mosco 2004; 
Hindman 2008), their meanings and their impact on political processes (Morozov 2011; 
Curran et al. 2012). This article responds to such urgency, and argues that a pivotal question of 
our time is to analyse the construction of web ideologies, and to reflect critically on how these 
ideologies can influence everyday political practices by legitimizing authoritarian and 
hierarchical forms of political organization.  
In this article we draw on the case study of Beppe Grillo and Casaleggio’s 5 Star 
Movement (5SM) in Italy, and we analyse and critically deconstruct the technological rhetoric 
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of Grillo and Casaleggio’s party/movement. In this article we show that the cyber-libertarian 
discourse of the 5SM was translated into political practices that, far from being horizontal and 
participatory, legitimized authoritarianism, populism and leadership.1 Our research focuses in 
particular on the 2012–2013 period that preceded and followed the electoral success of the 
5SM. It combines a discourse analysis of the media content produced by the 5SM with an 
historical analysis of Italy’s political practices and events. Moreover, our research also draws 
on reflections emerged from an in-depth interview with Giuliano Santoro, author of the book 
Un Grillo Qualunque/‘An ordinary cricket’2 (2012), one of the most profound analyses of the 
5SM from its origins to its 2013 electoral triumph. While the technological discourse of the 
5SM inspires a growing scholarly literature (Natale and Ballatore 2014; Dal Lago 2014; Treré 
and Barranquero 2013), we think that what is currently missing in the public debate is an 
exploration of how the web ideologies promoted by the 5SM translate into and eventually 
legitimize top-down, authoritarian political practices that invite reflection upon democratic 
processes, accountability and the role of old and new media. 
In the first section of this article we briefly describe and contextualize the emergence and 
the development of the 5SM, starting from the mainstream background of Beppe Grillo and 
all the way to the electoral triumph of the 5SM in the Italian 2013 national political elections. 
In the second section, we provide a critical analysis and deconstruction of the web ideologies 
that sustain the technological discourse of Grillo’s and Casaleggio’s party-movement. In the 
third section, we examine how these web ideologies are translated into political practices and 
how they legitimize top-down, anti-democratic and authoritarian politics.  
 
Beppe Grillo and the 5SM: A brief overview 
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The construction of Beppe Grillo as political leader: From mainstream media to digital 
conversion 
 
Before entering politics Grilllo was a well-known Italian actor and comedian who became 
famous with his shows at the end of the 1970s. He was especially famous for his 
performances as a stand-up comedian, in which he blended political satire with social and 
environmental campaigns, consumer rights and other topics. He also participated in  
television shows like Te la do io l’America/Here’s America for You (Trapani, 1981) and Te lo 
do io il Brasile/Here’s Brazil for You (Trapani, 1984), where he commented and made jokes 
about the lifestyle and culture of United States and Brazil. During these shows, Grillo 
commented pictures of his journeys to the United States and to Brazil, making abundant use 
of racist and cultural stereotypes about women, Jews and black (often called ‘negroes’) and 
Arab people, as well as exploiting every possible cliché about minorities and subcultures. 
Grillo also starred in television advertisements, and appeared in several movies (Santoro 
2012; Scanzi 2008). In 1986, while he was performing on the variety show 
Fantastico/Fantastic 7, he cracked a joke about the Italian Socialist Party in power at the time 
(he called them ‘thieves’) and was therefore banned from public television. After seven years 
of absence from television, Grillo returned with his Beppe Grillo show broadcast by the state 
television RAI in 1993, and this was his last appearance on Italian mainstream television 
(Scanzi 2008), but he was featured on the French channel Canal+ and on the Swiss TSI. One 
of the most interesting aspects of Beppe Grillo’s biography as a political leader can be found 
in the fact that his political persona was largely constructed through media lenses, and that 
Grillo was a profound connoisseur of the mechanisms of television to capture the audience’s 
attention. Following an established and problematic career within mainstream media, 
however, he started to radically criticize the media in favour of the Net,3 always written with a 
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capital initial  (Mello 2013; Santoro 2012) and constructed his political persona and political 
plan on the basis of this dichotomy.  
    Here it is important to understand that the digital conversion of Beppe Grillo and the 
related development of his political discourse was the result of a slow process of 
transformation, and of the encounter with his right-hand man Gianroberto Casaleggio.  
Gianroberto Casaleggio is one the most influential Italian experts on web technologies, social 
networks and electronic marketing (Orsatti 2010). He started his career in Olivetti, one of the 
most important Italian tech companies, in the 1990s and then became Chief Executive Officer 
of the Webegg company. In 2004 he founded the Casaleggio Associati company that created 
and manages all the communication activities of Beppe Grillo, including the management of 
the blog, the books and the DVDs of Grillo’s shows. Casaleggio is not only a businessman 
and profound connoisseur of online marketing strategies, he is also the author of several 
books, videos and newspaper articles where he professes his unconditional faith in the 
Internet and its power to revolutionize society, politics and economics. Through books such 
as Web dixit (2003), Web ergo sum (2004) and online videos like Prometheus – The Media 
Revolution, and Gaia – The Future of Politics,4 Casaleggio portrayed a future where tech 
corporations rule the world, and parties, politics, ideologies and religions disappear, leaving 
space for the emergence of a perfect form of direct democracy enabled by the Net. With his 
strong cyber-utopian discourse, marketing skills and technological pragmatism, Casaleggio 
was able to convince Grillo of the potential of the Net as an effective platform for his 
campaigns (Biorcio and Natale 2013; Orsatti 2010).  
    During the 1990s Grillo was a well-known luddite and criticized the increased 
pervasiveness of new technologies within the different dimensions of politics and everyday 
life. A key example of this can be found in the fact that in the year 2000, when he was on tour 
with his stand-up show ‘Time Out’, he used to end the show every evening by destroying a 
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computer with a giant hammer and invited the audience to join him.5 The encounter with 
Casaleggio completely changed Grillo’s attitude towards online media. He met him backstage 
at his Black Out show and he described him as a ‘crazy man. Crazy of a new craziness, in 
which everything changes for the better thanks to the Net’ (Casaleggio 2004: 7). In 2005, 
Grillo launched his own blog www.beppegrillo.it, created and managed by Casaleggio’s 
Milan-based company Casaleggio Associati, which specializes in web marketing. It was 
through the blog that Beppe Grillo started his to build his political campaign as well as the 
foundations for the 5SM. The blog combined elements of political critique against the ‘old’ 
and ‘monolithic’ forms of representative democracy, with calls for grassroots action and 
participation. On 22 November 2005, a page (which was self-financed through fundraising on 
the blog) appeared on the International Herald Tribune denouncing various members of the 
Italian parliament who had been convicted of a wide array of crimes (Grillo 2006). The blog 
was very successful from the start. In the same year it was launched, Time magazine 
nominated Grillo as one of its European Heroes of the year in the media realm (Geary 2005). 
Three years later in 2008 The Observer ranked the blog ninth among the most influential 
blogs in the world (Aldred et al. 2008).   
Since the very origins of his political campaign, Grillo combined online campaigning 
strategies with an intense schedule of offline tour activities, which progressively became more 
political and able to captivate a growing number of people. Relying on his blog, Grillo first 
invited his followers to organize themselves through the beppegrillo.meetup.com platform 
and then called on his supporters to take to the streets – actually, to the piazze/squares – of 
Italy on 8 September 2007 for the so called V-Day, where ‘V’ stood for the Italian expression 
Vaffanculo/fuck you all directed at Italian politicians. On that day, the main square of 
Bologna was filled with Grillo’s supporters who proposed the creation of a nationwide 
popular law initiative stipulating that: no Italian citizen found guilty at any one of the three 
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levels of justice of the Italian system could run for Parliament; no Italian citizen could be 
elected to Parliament for more than two terms; the electoral system should be modified to 
allow preferential voting. The V-Day was a success and gathered anything between 300,000–
500,000 people (according to conservative estimates) and a million people (according to the 
blog itself), with 350,000 signatures collected. During the V-Day, Grillo strongly criticized 
the electoral law then in force (passed by a Berlusconi government in 2005) that, based on 
fixed (closed) lists of candidates, did not allow citizens to choose their own representatives.6 
He went on stating that in contrast to this situation a ‘new rebirth’ (Grillo 2008) would begin 
from the local elections, where various lists of civic candidates called Friends of Beppe Grillo 
were being formed. Such events amounted to the proper birth of the 5SM. 
 
The rise and political triumph of the 5SM 
Following the 2007 V-Day, Grillo continued his strategy of combining political campaigns 
through the blog and the organization of meet-ups and of a second V-Day on 25 April 2008, 
where the main theme was ‘freedom of the press’, and proponents collected signatures for a 
referendum to end public subsidies for newspapers and periodicals. The integration of online 
campaigning and offline activities enabled Grillo and his emerging movement to campaign on 
local issues, and to construct the base for the movement’s first electoral bids. In the years 
2008 and 2009, the first members of the civic lists were elected in local councils. 
The official logo of the Movimento (movement) was introduced in October 2009. It 
included five stars, representing the pivotal issues of the party-movement mission: the 
safeguard of (1) public water and (2) the environment; the growth of, (3) public transport and 
(4) connectivity, and (5) development. In autumn 2010, Grillo supporters met in Cesena for a 
musical/political event named ‘Five Star Woodstock’ where the movement’s manifesto was 
presented. Between 2010 and 2013 the political influence of 5SM grew exponentially. In 
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2008, a few pro-Grillo supporters ran in municipal elections in eight cities of Italy obtaining 
2.43 per cent of the total vote. In 2010, at the regional elections, the 5SM ran in five regions 
and obtained over half a million votes, with peaks in two regions: Emilia-Romagna and 
Piemonte. At the local elections in 2011, Grillo fielded candidates in 75 municipalities, 
reaping 9.5 per cent of the vote in Bologna. 
The 2012 local elections marked a turning point in Italian politics. After Berlusconi’s 
resignation as PM in 2011, and with some mainstream Italian parties facing investigations for 
corruption (IDV and Lega Nord), the 5SM was able to ‘capitalize on the window of 
opportunity offered by the economic crisis and the social discontent about the new 
government’s austerity measures’ (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013: 5). Hence, during the 2012 
municipal elections, in the 43 municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants where it was 
present, the movement’s support rose from less than 4% to more than 10%, polling between 
8% and 12% in several Italian cities from the north – and reaching 14% of votes in Genoa, 
Grillo’s hometown and Liguria’s regional capital. Moreover, in 2012 the movement was able 
to elect its majors in four municipalities, all in the northern area: Mira and Sarego in Veneto 
and Comacchio and Parma in Emilia-Romagna. In the following months, the 5SM was third 
amongst coalitions and first among individual parties in the Sicilian Regional Elections held 
on 28 October 2012, showing that, while its strength lay in the urban areas of the industrial 
north, it was able to compete and reap consensus in the south too. In the summer of 2012 the 
5SM was considered by different polls as the second or third most popular party in Italy. For 
the first time in Italy, the 5SM candidates for the 2013 national political elections were 
chosen by party members through an online primary, held between 3 and 6 December 2012.  
On 22 February 2013, a large crowd attended the final rally of Grillo’s electoral campaign 
in the symbolic Piazza San Giovanni in Rome. In the 2013 Italian general elections, the 5SM 
reached 25.55% of the vote in the Chamber of Deputies, and 9.67% of overseas voters, for a 
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total of 8,784,499 votes. Grillo’s party was thus the second most voted list after the 
Democratic Party (PD) that obtained 25.42% of the votes in Italy and 29.9% abroad, 
accounting for 8,932,615 votes. In the Senate, the 5SM gained 23.79% in Italy and 10% 
abroad, for a total of 7,375,412 votes, again second only to the Partito Democratico 
(Democratic Party), which obtained 8,674,893 votes. It was an extraordinary result for the 
5SM that won 25.6% of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies, more than any other single 
party, although both the centre-left and the centre-right coalitions reaped more votes as 
coalitions. 
As the above facts have shown, and as others have argued (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; 
Corbetta and Gualmini 2013; Natale and Ballatore 2014; Pepe and Di Gennaro 2009) the 
rapid success of the 5SM was largely dependent on a new form of political campaigning that 
combined the use of Web 2.0 technologies with offline activities and public demonstrations. It 
is for this reason that, as Natale and Ballatore (2014) have shown, it is impossible to 
understand the rapid growth in political influence of the 5SM without looking at the way in 
which Grillo and Casaleggio’s political campaign was based on a profound technological 
utopianism, which heralded the emancipatory and politically liberatory potentials of new 
technologies. 
However, we will show that there is a main pitfall in Natale and Ballatore’s understanding 
of the structure and politics of the 5SM. Natale and Ballatore (2014) argued that the 5SM 
resembled contemporary grassroots social movements such as Occupy or the Indignados 
(Natale and Ballatore 2014: 109–10). On the contrary, we intend to demonstrate that this is far 
from being true. We will argue that cyber-utopianism enabled Grillo and Casaleggio to 
construct a presumed ‘movement ideology’ based on the understanding that they were leading 
a grassroots social movement defined by horizontal networks, participatory democracy and a 
new understanding of political engagement and participation. In fact we will show how the 
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techno-utopianism of Grillo and Casaleggio provided the ‘Net’ with political agency, and how 
this process of technological fetishism served to legitimize a top-down, anti-democratic and 
authoritarian forms of politics. Therefore we will argue that Natale and Ballatore’s work fails 
to explore the complex interconnection between technological discourses and technological 
fetishism, and to assess how technologies are invested with a particular agency of their own. 
 
Techno-utopianism and web ideologies in the 5SM: Supersession, blogging revolution 
and transparency 
Technological utopianism has a long history as the relationship between new technologies 
and utopian discourses has been a key factor in the development of western thought. As Segal 
(2005) has argued, the understanding that technologies can become tools for social liberation 
and freedom is a discourse found in a variety of works in social theory, from the work of 
Tommaso Campanella to nineteenth-century thinkers like Saint-Simon, Comte, Owen, 
Fourier, and of course Marx and Engels (2005: 2). These works all reflect the peculiarly 
western understanding that science and technology can solve some of society’s problems, 
especially with reference to social and political organization, and can take humanity closer to 
the utopian idea of a ‘perfect society’ developed in Thomas More’s Utopia (1995). If we 
consider the history of technological utopianism and its interconnection with the development 
of western thought, we cannot be surprised by the fact that such understandings have also 
been applied to the development of computer-mediated communication and Internet 
technologies. This is particularly evident if we consider the development of cyber-libertarian 
ideologies in San Francisco. As Turner (2006) has shown by examining the growth of the 
Whole Earth network in San Francisco, between 1968 and 1998 technologists were 
profoundly influenced by counter-cultural discourses of computers as tools for personal and 
social liberation. As some have argued (Castells 2001), these cyber-libertarian ideologies 
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have played a fundamental role in the historical development of the Internet and in the 
creation of the World Wide Web.  
 The understanding that cyber-libertarianism and techno-utopianism defined the history 
of the Internet and the development of web technologies is at the very heart of much of 
contemporary critique in communication and social research. Mosco’s (2004) ground-
breaking book on the digital sublime has demonstrated how western fascination with the 
newness of technologies has enabled us to construct mythical understandings of how digital 
media is supposedly magical, socially transformative and democratically empowering (Mosco 
2004). As Natale and Ballatore (2014) have shown, this emphasis on novelty has defined the 
political discourses of Grillo and the 5SM, a novelty often constructed through the techno-
utopian belief in the ideology of supersession. Supersession is the notion according to which 
each new medium supersedes, i.e. ‘vanquishes or subsumes its predecessors’ (Gitelman and 
Pingree 2003: 13), an idea that media historians have seen at work during various waves of 
ages of media reflections on emerging technologies. According to this idea, the book is 
doomed to be replaced by the computers just like the phonograph was destined to be 
supplanted by the introduction and the adoption of the radio. According to techno-utopian 
cyber-libertarians, each new technological innovation inevitably supersedes its predecessor. 
In the 2011 political manifesto titled, ‘Siamo in guerra. Per una nuova politica’/‘We are at 
war. For a new politics’, written by Grillo and Casaleggio, the logic of supersession is clear. 
This manifesto represents one of the most striking examples of the ‘electronic utopianism’ 
(Dal Lago 2014) of the Grillo/Casaleggio duo. In the manifesto, the voice of Casaleggio 
resonates stronger than Grillo’s, arguing that in the age of the Net ‘newspapers are vanishing, 
then it will be the turn of televisions, then books. In ten or twenty years, they will be all 
considered as extinct species’ (2011: 3). Grillo and Casaleggio thus announce the inevitable 
death of the press, and the end/replacement of mainstream media – particularly television – by 
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digital media and by the power of interconnected multitudes of citizen journalists. As their 
manifesto states, the Net is ‘a supermedium that absorbs, and therefore eliminates, all the 
others […] In a relatively short time – a decade, maybe two – nothing will be as before. All 
the [present] media will disappear’ (2011: 7). The ideology of supersession has largely 
influenced the political practice of the 5SM. The second V-Day of 2008 was entirely devoted 
to obtain enough signatures in order for a referendum to abolish Italy’s national professional 
register of journalists, and to eliminate State-funded contributions to the publishing industry. 
Grillo and Casaleggio’s political discourse has constructed the figure of the journalist as a 
‘servant’ (of power), ‘wet tongue’ and ‘shit’. In a blog post dated 9 July 2010, Grillo (2010) 
exemplifies his vision of journalism and of the ‘blogging revolution’. He writes:  
 
The newspapers should not be confused with true information. Newspapers and true 
information are totally incompatible. Where the former exists, the latter is nowhere to be 
found. In the past few years, the only true information has been spread by the bloggers, the 
Web and the counter-information sites […]. Newspapers have been rendered obsolete by 
the Web, just as the telegraph rendered the Pony Express obsolete so many years ago […] 
The citizens are the only ones spreading any information at all. The journalist’s register 
must be abolished. All of us are journalists. 
 
This is one of the clearest illustrations of how the notion of technological supersession goes 
hand in hand with another web ideology endorsed by Grillo: the superiority of bloggers and 
citizen journalists, who, according to him, are the only ones to provide real information. For 
Grillo, journalists do not make sense in the new digital world, because user-generated content 
produced by a multitude of citizens-journalists is the only information worth reading. ‘All of 
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us are journalists’ strengthens the idea that, because there are no intermediaries, citizen 
journalism is always superior to other forms of traditional journalism.  
One interesting aspect that emerges from Grillo and Casaleggio technological discourse is 
that they draw on the techno-optimism implicit to much of contemporary understandings of 
Web 2.0 technologies. In particular they praise the role of the so-called prosumer (Toffler 
1980; Tapscott and Williams 2006). As Grillo and Casaleggio write: ‘all the information will 
converge on the Net and everyone could become prosumer (in English in the original), i.e. at 
the same time producer and consumer of information’ (2011: 17). For Grillo and Casaleggio, 
multitudes of prosumer citizen journalists will replace journalists by uploading and sharing 
their user-generated content. The fact that everyone online can potentially be a creator of 
content is automatically equated with empowerment, and the fact that anyone can produce and 
share information, is automatically enough for Grillo and his techno-guru to turn everyone 
into a professional journalist, thus making the same idea of journalism obsolete. Furthermore, 
Grillo and Casaleggio completely gloss over the fact that bloggers and citizen journalists also 
post and comment their articles according to their subjective perceptions of reality and 
following their political agendas, and can thus suffer from biases, prejudices and fallacies just 
as any other journalist. These ideologies are then paired with another technological myth, 
transparency, i.e. 
 
The assumption that each new medium actually mediates less; that it successfully 
‘frees’ information from the constraints of previously inadequate or ‘unnatural’ media 
forms that represented reality less perfectly. (Gitelman and Pingree 2003: 13) 
 
In their manifesto, the two authors state that ‘in the Net, transparency is an obligation, you 
cannot lie’ (2011: pos. 1142). This is because, according to Grillo and Casaleggio (2011), in 
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the Net collective intelligence will always prevail, and the one who is providing false 
information will immediately lose credibility.  
 Also Natale and Ballatore (2014) argue that the techno-utopianism of Grillo and the 
5SM was constructed on the belief that new media will replace old media. However, Natale 
and Ballatore (2014) focus on a generalized understanding of techno-utopian discourses, by 
drawing on the notion of digital sublime (Mosco 2004). In so doing, they fail to explore 
thoroughly the complex relationship between the digital sublime and the techno-utopianism 
intrinsic to the field of digital politics and the study of social movements, especially with 
reference to the concept of ‘network’.  
  
Techno-utopianism and the Ideology of the Movement: How digital discourse can 
legitimize authoritarianism 
The construction of the net and the ideology of the movement 
‘One is worth one’ is one of the most famous mottos of the 5SM, i.e. everyone has equal 
weight inside the 5SM. One of the strongest ideologies sustaining the political discourse of 
the 5SM is that for the Net ‘the concept of leader is a curse. There are only spokespersons for 
the citizens’ demands’ (2011: pos. 146). Therefore, not only do ‘political leaders make no 
sense’ in the digital era, but ‘whoever defines himself as a leader should undergo mandatory 
medical treatment’ (2011: pos. 146). Grillo and Casaleggio’s technological discourse depicts 
the Net as a utopian techno-political space where all persons will be able to decide in relation 
to the political choices they are involved in, because every citizen will be part of a collective 
intelligence. Casaleggio makes this point clearer in a recent interview: 
 
Direct democracy, enabled by the Net, is not only relative to popular consultations, but 
also to a new centrality of the citizen within society. The political and social 
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organizations of today will be destructured, and some will disappear. Representative 
democracy, through [parliamentary] mandate, will lose its meaning. It is first and 
foremost a cultural revolution, and then technological; for this reason, often, it is not 
understood or it is banalized. (D’Anna 2013) 
 
As Dal Lago has underlined (2014: 60), in Casaleggio’s vision, the Net is not simply a tool 
that can improve democracy, but it is democracy itself. In order to understand the techno-
utopianism of Grillo and Casaleggio and to appreciate properly the relationship between 
digital and political discourse, we believe it is of paramount importance to examine the social 
movements’ literature of the last decades and to reflect critically on the notion of ‘network’.  
 Research on digital activism flourished at the beginning of the 2000s (Meikle 2002; 
McCaughey and Ayers 2003; Atton 2004); however, the last ten years have seen a 
proliferation of different approaches on digital activism, which have tried to make sense of 
the relationship between new web technologies and the rise of mass mobilizations (Castells 
2009, 2012; Hands 2011; Earl and Kimport 2011; Lievrouw 2011; Gerbaudo 2012; Juris 
2012). The notion of ‘network’ has acquired a fundamental importance within the wide 
variety of literature produced on the topic in the last decade. 
In researching the movements of the late 1990s Castells (1996) argued that we need to 
understand the role of Internet technologies by recognizing how they impacted the creation of 
new forms of political imagination and belonging, where the network became a privileged and 
more flexible mode of social organization. Similarly, the autonomous Italian Marxist tradition 
(Hardt and Negri 2000, 2009; Virno 2004) introduced concepts such as ‘multitude’ and 
‘swarms’ to argue that we were witness to the rise of a new form of networked struggle, 
which did not rely on discipline, but on creativity, communication and self-organized 
cooperation (2000: 83). Other examples can be found in Webster (2001) or in the one by Juris 
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(2008) on the global justice movements. These works on social movements and new web 
technologies argued that the logic of networks, which was triggered and facilitated by Internet 
technologies, was radically transforming political participation, and fostering grassroots forms 
of political engagement based on horizontalism, participatory democracy, and the 
deconstruction of hierarchies.  
One crucial and interesting aspect of these works in the field of social movements is that, 
by combining an analysis on technological developments with an analysis of changing 
patterns in forms of social organization, they often came to the conclusion that the ‘network’ 
became a new ‘autonomous’ political agent, which was replacing ‘old’ forms of political 
engagement and participation (Castells 2009) and which was defined by the collective 
intelligence of the ‘swarm’ (Hardt and Negri 2009).  
These understandings, we argue, have largely influenced the political discourse of the 
5SM. As has become evident from our analysis of Grillo and Casaleggio’s discourses, the 
overall ideology of the 5SM is that of the Internet conceived as ‘autonomous technology’ 
(Winner 1977). The concept of autonomous technology (Winner 1977) sees technology as a 
force that transcends history, and it is not shaped by social, political and cultural forces, but is 
just ‘out there’, waiting to be discovered. Hence Grillo’s and Casaleggio’s next move. 
Decontextualizing the Net and stripping Internet technologies from their social, economical 
and political context, the comedian and the techno-guru interpret the Internet as an 
autonomous force that transcends history. According to Grillo and Casaleggio, the Net 
functions not within constrains and conflicts generated by social relations and practices 
between human beings and institutions, but according its own, transcendent set of rules. 
Moreover, the two leaders present the Net as the end of all exploitation, as a bringer of social 
change, as a new, horizontal, positive, liberating and emancipatory force that will 
revolutionize politics and everyday life. Here the rhetoric of the autonomous technology 
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(Winner 1977) meets the rhetoric of inevitability (Nardi and O’Day 1999: 17) that 
characterizes technological development and progress as inexorable. As the two politicians 
write, ‘The re-positioning of information on the Net is irreversible: a drop that carves the 
stone, a continuous outpouring, as that of grain of sands of an hourglass’ (2011: pos. 146).  
Therefore, by positing the Net as an autonomous political agent, which they present as able 
to transcend and replace ‘old’ political hierarchies and inequalities, the leaders of the 5SM put 
in place a process of technological fetishism, which enables them to construct the Net as a 
political agent. By claiming that the ‘The Net is on our side’ (2011: 6), Grillo and Casaleggio 
managed to construct an ideology of the movement, and to present the 5SM as a grassroots 
movement based on horizontal networks, participatory democracy and no obvious leaders. 
They were able to present themselves as a movement, despite the fact that, as many have 
shown (Del Lago 2013; Mello 2013; Santoro 2012), the 5SM is defined by hierarchical, 
authoritarian and anti-democratic political practices. The most interesting aspect here is that 
these practices are often legitimized through digital discourse, and through the processes of 
technological fetishism.  
 
Net-authoritarianism: Technological fetishism and its impact on political practice 
As the above part has shown the techno-utopian discourses of the 5SM enabled Grillo and 
Casaleggio to fetishize ‘the Net’ as an autonomous political agent. Harvey argues that the 
process of technological fetishism is defined by the habit of humans to invest objects with 
‘self-contained’, mysterious and even magical powers, and to believe that these objects are 
able to move and shape the world (2003: 3). Harvey’s indebtedness to Marx’s (1977) concept 
of commodity fetishism is clear. The basic understanding is that humans are constantly 
involved in the production of specific objects, systems and technologies but that capitalism 
detaches (alienates) humans from these processes of production, and thus makes them believe 
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that the market, commodities or technological objects are autonomous agents, endowed with 
their own intelligence, and able to define the world.  
Within anthropology these human processes of fetishism have been thoroughly explored. 
Moreover, anthropologists have argued that, although fetishism is an entirely human process 
that says much about the way in which different cultures construct their values and meanings 
(Hornborg 1992, 2001; Graeber 2007), ‘technological fetishism’ is often at the very heart of 
Westernized notions of modernity and progress (Hornborg 1992; Pfaffenberger 1988). In this 
framework, the ‘machine’ (Hornborg 1992) is invested with an agency of its own and affects 
social realities in complex ways.  
The understanding of the process of technological fetishism, we believe, is essential to the 
analysis of the 5SM. This is because it enables us to move beyond a mere deconstruction of 
the techno-utopian discourses promoted by Grillo and Casaleggio and to evaluate critically 
their impact on everyday political practice. Here, it is important to understand that, as Harvey 
(2003) has argued, technological fetishism cannot be considered a ‘drive’ in itself, as this 
conception would itself be fetishist; however, technological fetishism does mediate and 
redirect the actions of social agents and it does have real effects on social relationships and 
shared beliefs (Harvey 2003: 10). According to Jodi Dean (2009: 38), technological fetishism 
in politics transforms relationships in significant ways because it enables subjects to construct 
the Internet/Net as an acting subject in its own right without assuming responsibility 
themselves. In the context of the 5SM, the constant reference to the Net as an acting and 
democratic subject, which was promoted through the ‘ideology of the movement’, has 
enabled Grillo and Casaleggio simultaneously to construct the belief that they were leading a 
democratic movement, whilst legitimizing top-down and authoritarian forms of political 
practice.  
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Beppe Grillo’s role as leader is clearly stated within the so-called ‘non statute’, the official 
ruling document of the movement. Grillo announced the non-statute with a blog post on 
December 2009 (Grillo 2009) in enthusiastically shrill tones. The comedian reiterated in the 
post the revolutionary significance that this document embodied, replicating usual formulas as 
‘one is worth one’, ‘the mass becomes intelligent and self-governs itself’, and making a 
strong declaration at the end of the post: ‘Fuck [political] parties, there will be no 
headquarters […], those headquarters with four old men inside with chairs and their 
spokesperson talking, there will be nothing like that!’.  
However, if we carefully examine the 5SM non-statute, we can see that it represents a 
powerful ruling act to the point that it can be considered a ‘legal deed of property, because it 
gives Grillo – and him only – the material, symbolic, and political control of a movement that 
coincides with his blog (Dal Lago 2014: 84). Article 1 defines the 5SM as a platform that 
originates, has its epicentre and coincides with the blog www.beppegrillo.it. It is clear that the 
old ‘traditional’ party headquarters criticized by Grillo have not disappeared, but have rather 
been replaced entirely by the blog, the only legitimate headquarters of the 5SM, owned by 
Grillo and carefully managed by the Casaleggio Associati firm. Article 3 further affirms that 
‘the name of the 5 Star Movement is linked to a trademark owned by Beppe Grillo, the only 
holder of the rights to use it’.7 Grillo is therefore the only owner of the blog, and consequently 
of the party, and possesses the authority to expel any member of the 5SM for whatever reason 
he deems appropriate.  
During the last years, on many occasions Grillo has exerted the power to exclude or expel 
several members of the party at his own will. In March 2012, Valentino Tavolazzi, councillor 
of the Ferrara municipality, was removed because he had planned a convention in Rimini in 
order to discuss issues related to the organization of the movement. A few months later, in 
December 2012, Giovanni Favia, a regional councillor of the Emilia-Romagna region, was 
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expelled after his ‘off the air’ conversation with a journalist was broadcast on national 
televisions. During that informal off the air talk, Favia complained about the lack of 
democracy within the 5SM, arguing that decisions were totally in the hands of the duo Grillo-
Casaleggio. During the last years, Grillo has evicted several local councillors of the party in 
ten Italian regions, Emilia-Romagna being the most rebellious region with at least ten 
municipal and regional councillors expelled (Pierattini 2014). The list of removals could 
continue, but it goes beyond the scope of the present article; what we want to point out here is 
that the ideology of horizontality epitomized by the ‘one is worth one’ expression, linked to 
the alleged magical power of online networks automatically to supersede the need for a 
leader, is but a façade – a façade that hides, facilitates and eventually legitimizes top-down 
strategies of tight control by Grillo and Casaleggio.  
The beating heart of the 5MS, the www.beppegrillo.it blog, has also been at the centre of 
several controversies, conflicts and struggles. First of all, we cannot ignore the almost self-
evident critique that a man who enjoys an amazing media success, who has created the party, 
and who owns the blog can scarcely have the same exact impact as do the myriad of citizens 
whose comments get lost in an incessant flow of digital forgetfulness. While the posts by 
Grillo and Casaleggio always obtain the highest degree of visibility and relevance on the 
platform, the other comments on the blog are nothing more than irrelevant contributions, part 
of an incessantly circulating stream of information. In this respect, Dean’s reflections on the 
fantasy of abundance in communicative capitalism are enlightening:  
 
Content is irrelevant. Who sent it is irrelevant. Who receives it is irrelevant. That it need 
be responded to is irrelevant. The only thing that is relevant is circulation, the addition 
to the pool. Any particular contribution remains secondary to the fact of circulation. 
(Dean 2005: 58) 
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In addition to the issue of public visibility, we must be aware of the fact that the mechanisms 
of content selection and information filtering behind the blog are far from being transparent. 
In a blog dated 16 March 2013, Grillo (2013a) wrote a post where he attacked the Italian 
Senators members of his party who, in a secret ballot, voted to elect Piero Grasso as president 
of the Italian Senate, instead of a blank vote as the majority of 5SM’s parliamentarians had 
decided. Launched before 11:00 p.m. on Saturday 16 March, the post had already been 
commented by more than 7500 people on Sunday 17 at 2:00 p.m. Many comments were 
critical, e.g. pseudonym Ferdinand Bardamu who praised the 5SM senators who had the 
courage to rebel and criticize the ‘authoritarian turn’ of the party. The post by Bardamu 
gained more than 250 preferences, but his post, as several others (2250), was removed a few 
hours later (Strada 2013). This is just one of the many examples of blog censorship practices 
that commentators and journalists have highlighted during the last years, to the point that 
various websites and Facebook pages have now been created in order to monitor and expose 
the mechanisms of systematic censorship and eradication of dissidence within the 5SM online 
platform.8 On 24 March 2013, Grillo (2013b) stated in a blog post that the many expressions 
of divergence and contrast within his blog were nothing more than orchestrated hordes of 
trolls and fake profiles that regularly infested the platform: he termed those comments ‘squirts 
of digital shit’.  
    In conclusion to this part therefore, it seems evident that the technological fetishism of the 
Net as an autonomous political agent has enabled Grillo and Casaleggio to conceal their 
authoritarian practices, especially with reference to the construction of Grillo as leader and to 
the management of the blog, and hence the political culture of the ‘movement’ in general. 
This, we believe, is a powerful example of the problematic effects of techno-utopianism on 
social organization and democracy. 
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Conclusion: Unmasking false movement ideologies 
From our analysis, it appears clear that the digital rhetoric of horizontality, lack of leadership 
and spontaneity of the party is used to mask, facilitate and eventually legitimize centralized 
and authoritarian practices. The loudly celebratory, emancipatory and utopian technological 
discourse/rhetoric of the 5SM operates as an obfuscating mechanism that hides professional 
marketing strategies and hierarchical political processes.   
    We would like to point out that our article’s purpose was not only the deconstruction of 
contemporary web ideologies, and the exploration of the ways through which technological 
discourse is used to legitimize political strategies of social control. Through the critical 
examination that we have proposed we wish to draw the attention of analysts, journalists and 
scholars to the dangers of equating practices such as the one of the 5SM with those of 
movements as the Spanish Indignados 9  or the Occupy Wall Street protest. 10  This point 
emerged lucidly in the in-depth interview we carried out with Giuliano Santoro, who 
repeatedly pointed out the fact that the 5SM filled a void that Italian social movements had 
proven unable to occupy. While in May 2011 the Indignados movement emerged in Spain, 
flooding the squares in a continuous and spontaneous feedback between the streets and 
several online platforms (Candón Mena 2013), Grillo, speaking from his position of leader, 
invited everyone to focus on the polls instead. The demonstrations held by the Italian 5MS are 
not the product of spontaneous, horizontal multitudes joining together to protest, but rather, 
amount to hetero-directed, controlled and piloted forms of contention. Even if we do not 
advocate a neat, oversimplifying division between spontaneous and hierarchical movements, 
with our article we hope to stimulate future analyses of emerging movements to apply a 
constant epistemic vigilance, in order to unmask the role of technological discourse in 




Aldred, J., Astell, A., Behr, R.,  Cochrane, L., Hind, J., Pickard, A., Potter, L., Wignall, A. 
and  Wiseman, E. (2008), ‘The world’s 50 most powerful blogs’, The Guardian, 9 
March. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2008/mar/09/blogs. Accessed 7 
February 2014.  
Atton, C. (2004), An Alternative Internet: Radical Media, Politics and Creativity, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Benkler, Y. (2006), The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets 
and Freedom, Yale: Yale University Press. 
Biorcio, R. and Natale, P. (2013), Politica a 5 Stelle/‘Politics 5 Stars Style’, Milano: 
Feltrinelli. 
Bordignon, F. and Ceccarini, L. (2013), ‘Five stars and a cricket. Beppe Grillo shakes Italian 
politics’, South European Society and Politics, 18:4, pp. 427–49. 
Candón Mena, J. (2013), Toma la calle, toma las redes: El movimiento 15M en internet/‘Take 
the streets, take the networks: The 15M movement in the internet’, Sevilla: Editorial 
Atrapasueños. 
Casaleggio, G. (2003), WebDixit, Milano: Il Sole 24 Ore. 
____ (2004), Web ergo sum/’Web therefore I am’, Milano: Sperling & Kupfer. 
Casaleggio, G. and Grillo, B. (2011), Siamo in guerra/We are at War, Milano: Chiare Lettere. 
Castells, M. (1996), The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, 
Society, and Culture, vol. 1, John Wiley & Sons. 
____ (2001), The Internet Galaxy, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
____ (2009), Communication Power, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
____ (2012), Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age, 
 25 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Corbetta, P. and Gualmini, E. (2013), Il Partito di Grillo/The Party of Grillo, Bologna: Il 
Mulino. 
Curran, J., Fenton, N. and Freedman, D. (2012), Misunderstanding the Internet, New York: 
Routledge. 
Dal Lago, A. (2014), Clic! Grillo, Casaleggio e la demagogia elettronica/Click! Grillo, 
Casaleggio and Electronic Demagogy, Napoli: Edizioni Cronopio. 
Dean, J. (2005), ‘Communicative capitalism: Circulation and the foreclosure of politics’, 
Cultural Politics, 1:1, pp. 51–74. 
____ (2009), Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and 
Left Politics, Durham: Duke University Press. 
D’Anna, S. (2013), ‘Intervista con Gianroberto Casaleggio. La democrazia va 
rifondata’/‘Interview with Gianroberto Casaleggio. Democracy must be refounded’, 24 
June, http://lettura.corriere.it/la-democrazia-va-rifondata/. Accessed 16 January 2014. 
Earl, J. and Kimport, K. (2011), Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet 
Age, Cambridge, MA: Mit Press. 
Geary, J. (2005), ‘Why they’re heroes’, Time, 2 October, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1112757,00.htm. Accessed 1 
March 2014. 
Gerbaudo, P. (2012), Tweets and the Streets, London: Pluto Press. 
Gitelman, L. and Pingree, G. (eds) (2003), New Media, 1740–1915, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Graeber, D. (2007), ‘Fetishism as social creativity: Or fetishes are god in the process of being 
made’, in Possibilities: Essays on Hierarchy, Rebellion, and Desire, Oakland and 
Edinburgh: AK Press, pp. 113–57. 
 26 
Grillo, B. (2006), Incantesimi, DVD, Milan: Casaleggio Associati. 
____ (2008), ‘Civic lists: Starting now’, 24 January, http://www.beppegrillo.it/en/2008/01/. 
Accessed 24 February 2014. 
____ (2009), ‘Grillo168 – Il “Non-Statuto” del MoVimento a 5 Stelle’/‘Grillo168 – The 
“Non-Statute” of the 5 Star Movement’, 10 December, 
http://www.beppegrillo.it/2009/12/grillo168_il_no.html. Accessed 2 February 2014.  
____ (2010), ‘365 di questi giorni’/‘365 of these days’, 9 July 
http://www.beppegrillo.it/2010/07/365_di_questi_g.html. Accessed 27 February 2014. 
____ (2013a), ‘Trasparenza e voto segreto’/‘Transparency and secret ballot’, 16 March, 
http://www.beppegrillo.it/2013/03/trasparenza_e_v/index.html. Accessed 26 February 
2014.  
____ (2013b), ‘Schizzi di merda digitale’/‘Squirts of digital shit’, 24 March, 
http://www.beppegrillo.it/2013/03/schizzi_di_merda_digitali.html. Accessed 26 
February 2014. 
Hands, J. (2011), @ is for Activism: Dissent, Resistance and Rebellion in a Digital Culture,  
London: Pluto Press.  
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000), Empire, Harvard University Press. 
____ (2009), Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, Penguin Books. 
Harvey, D. (2003) ‘The fetish of technology: Causes and consequences’, Macalester 
International, Vol. 13, Article 7, 
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1411&context=mac
intl. Accessed 3 January 2014. 
Hindman, M. (2008), The Myth of Digital Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hornborg, A. (1992), ‘Machine fetishism, value and the image of unlimited good: Towards a 
thermodynamics of imperialism’, Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and 
 27 
Ireland, 27:1, pp. 1–18. 
____ (2001), The Power of the Machine: Global Inequalities of Economy, Technology and 
Environment, Oxford: Altamira Press. 
Juris, J. (2008), Networking Futures: The Movements against Corporate Globalization, US: 
Duke University Press. 
____ (2012), ‘Reflections on #occupy everywhere: Social media, public space, and emerging 
logics of aggregation’, American Ethnologist, 39:2, pp. 259–79. 
Lievrouw, L. (2011), Alternative and Activist New Media, Cambridge: Polity. 
Marx, Karl (1977), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (trans. Ben Fowkes), vol.1, New 
York: Vintage Books.  
McCaughey, M. and Ayers, M. (2003), Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and 
Practice, New York: Routledge. 
Meikle, G. (2002), Future Active: Media Activism and the Internet, Australia: Pluto Press. 
Mello, F. (2013), Il lato oscuro delle stelle. La dittatura digitale di Grillo e Casaleggio. 
Testimonianze, documenti e retroscena inediti/‘The dark side of the stars. The digital 
dictatorship of Grillo and Casaleggio. Testimony, documents and unpublished 
background’, Reggio Emilia: Imprimatur. 
More, T. (1995), Utopia (trans. Logan G. M. and Adams R. M.), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Morozov, E. (2011), The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, New York: 
Public Affairs. 
Mosco, V. (2004), The Digital Sublime: Myth, Power, and Cyberspace, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Nardi, B. and O’Day, V. (1999), Information Ecologies: Using Technology with Heart,  
Boston, MA: MIT Press. 
 28 
Natale, S. and Ballatore, A. (2014), ‘The web will kill them all: New media, digital utopia, 
and political struggle in the Italian 5-Star Movement’, Media, Culture & Society, 36:1, 
pp. 105–21.   
Negroponte, N. (1995), Being Digital, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 
O’Reilly, T. (2005), ‘What is Web 2.0: Design patterns and business models for the next 
generation of software’, http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html. Accessed 
7 January 2014. 
Orsatti, P. (2010), ‘Grillo e il suo Spin Doctor: la Casaleggio Associati’/‘Grillo and his Spin 
Doctor: the Casaleggio Associati’, Micromega, 5. http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-
online/grillo-e-il-suo-spin-doctor-la-casaleggio-associati/. Accessed 8 February 2014.  
Pepe, A. and Di Gennaro, C. (2009), ‘Political protest Italian-style: The blogosphere and 
mainstream media in the promotion and coverage of Beppe Grillo's V-day’, First 
Monday, 14:12–7. http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-online/grillo-e-il-suo-spin-
doctor-la-casaleggio-associati/. Accessed 10 February 2014.  
Pfaffenberger, B. (1988), ‘Fetished objects and humanised nature: Towards an anthropology 
of technology’, Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 3:2, pp. 
236–52. 
Pierattini, L. (2014), ‘5SM, la diaspora silenziosa sul territorio’/‘5SM, the silent diáspora on 
the territory’, La Repubblica, 2 March, 
http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/03/02/news/5SM-80006708/?ref=HREC1-8. 
Accessed 12 February 2014.  
Rheingold, H. (1994), The Virtual Community: Finding Connection in a Computerized World, 
London: Secker & Warburg. 
Santoro, G. (2012), Un grillo qualunque. Il movimiento 5 stelle e il populismo digitale nella 
crisi dei partiti italiani/‘An ordinary cricket. The 5 star movement, and digital populism in 
 29 
the crisis of Italian parties’, Roma: Castelvecchi. 
Scanzi, A. (2008), Ve lo do Io Beppe Grillo/‘Here’s Beppe Grillo for you’, Milan, Italy: 
Mondadori.  
Segal, H. P. (2005), Technological Utopianism in American Culture, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press. 
Shirky, C. (2008), Here comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations, 
London and New York: Penguin Books. 
Strada, M. (2013), ‘Grillo, l'anatema contro i «dissidenti» e quei commenti scomparsi dal 
blog’/‘Grillo, the anatema against the “dissidents” and those comments disappeared 
from the blog’, Il Corriere della Sera, 17 March, 
http://www.corriere.it/politica/13_marzo_17/grillo-blog-censura-dissenso-
scomunica_c854d658-8eff-11e2-95d7-5288341dcc81.shtml. Accessed 7 January 2014.  
Tapscott, D. and Williams, A. (2006), Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes 
Everything, New York: Portfolio Trade, Penguin Books. 
Toffler, A. (1980), The Third Wave, New York: Bantam Books. 
Toffler, A. and Toffler, H. (1995), Creating a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third 
Wave, Turner. 
Trapani, E. (1981), Te la do io l’America/Here’s America for You, Rome: RaiUno.  
____ (1984), Te lo do io il Brasile/Here’s Brazil for You, Rome: RaiUno.  
Treré, E. and Barranquero, A. (2013), ‘De mitos y sublimes digitales: movimientos sociales y 
tecnologías de la comunicación desde una perspectiva histórica’/‘On myths and digital 
sublimes: social movements and communication technologies from a historical 
perspective’, Revista de Estudios para el Desarrollo Social de la Comunicación, 8, pp. 
27–47, Redes.com. 
Turner, F (2006), From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth 
 30 
Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Virno, P. (2004), Grammar of The Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary forms of Life, 
Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e) / Foreign Agents. 
Webster, F. (ed.) (2001), Culture and Politics in the Information Age: A New Politics, London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Winner, L. (1977), Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political 
Thought, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Woolgar, S. (ed.) (2002), Virtual Society. Technology, Cyberbole, Reality, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Wu Ming (2011), ‘Fetishism of digital commodities and hidden exploitation: The cases of 
Amazon and Apple’, 10 October, 
http://www.wumingfoundation.com/english/wumingblog/?p=1895. Accessed 5 
February 2014. 
Wu Ming (2013), ‘Grillismo, yet another right-wing cult from Italy’, 8 March, 




Emiliano Treré is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of the 
Autonomous University of Querétaro, Mexico. His research combines insights from media 
practice theory, media ecological approaches, critical political economy of communication, 
mediation and mediatization paradigms and the sociology of culture and communication in 
order to study social movements, digital activism and communication technologies. His work 
has been published in journals such as New Media & Society (Sage, 2012), Communication 
 31 
Theory (Wiley, 2014), the International Journal of Communication (USC Annenberg Press, 
2012), Global Media and Communication (Sage, 2014), Convergence (Sage, 2014) and 
Communication & Society (School of Communication, University of Navarra, 2014), and in 
edited books in English, Spanish and Italian. He is currently writing a book provisionally 
titled Contemporary Mexican Struggles and Digital Resistance. 
 
Veronica Barassi is Lecturer and the Director of the B.A. Anthropology and Media in the 
Department of Media and Communications at Goldsmiths University of London. Her work 
was published in Communication Review (Routledge, 2011) New Media and Society (Sage, 
2012) Social Movements Studies (Routledge, 2012) Global Media and Communication (Sage, 
2013) and she is currently working on her first book Activism on the Web: The Everyday 
Struggle against Digital Capitalism (Routledge, forthcoming). She is one of the vice-chairs of 
the Digital Culture Section of the European Communication Research and Education 
Association (ECREA). She is also the Chair of the online seminars of the EASA Media 
Anthropology Network and one of the founders of the Goldsmiths Media Ethnography Group. 
 
Contact: 
Emiliano Treré, Autonomous University of Querétaro, Centro Universitario, Cerro de las 
Campanas S/N, 76010 Santiago de Querétaro, Querétaro, Mexico. 
E-mail: etrere@gmail.com 
 
Veronica Barassi, Department of Media and Communications, Goldsmiths University of 






                                                        
1
 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the original Italian are ours. 
 
2
 ‘An Ordinary Cricket. The 5SM, and Digital Populism in the Crisis of Italian Parties’. The 
title plays on the meaning of the movement’s leader surname ‘Grillo’, which is the equivalent 
of ‘cricket’ in Italian. 
3
 In the political discourse of the 5SM, the notion of ‘Net’ is often used to refer to a political 
agent that is defined by the merging of technologies and social networks, whilst the ‘Web’ is 
usually used to refer to the technology. However, at times the two definitions overlap. 
4
 According to Wu Ming (2011). 
5
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4jdHN4edCqA. Accessed 6 February 2014. 
6
 See http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/05270l.htm. Accessed 6 February 2014.  
7 The non-statute is available here: https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/materiali-
bg/Regolamento-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdf. Accessed 6 February 2014.  
8
 See in particular: http://nocensura.eusoft.net/; https://www.facebook.com/nocensura2014. 
Accessed 6 February 2014.  
For the record, Ferdinand Bardamu is the (not particularly likeable) protagonist of Louis-
Ferdinand Céline’s 1932 novel Journey to the End of the Night (Voyage au bout de la nuit). 
9
 The most read newspaper in Spain, El País, was also a victim of the techno-fascination 
exerted by the 5SM:  
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/05/25/actualidad/1369496053_171788.html. Accessed 
11 February 2014.  
10 On this point, see also the reflections developed by Wu Ming (2013), 
http://www.wumingfoundation.com/english/wumingblog/?p=1950. Accessed 2 February 
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